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Economic Inequality in the United States 
 
  Good afternoon, and thank you very much for inviting me to deliver this year's 
Economics of Governance Lecture.
1 My topic today will be the performance of the U.S. 
economy, with a focus on how trends for the economy as a whole—in other words, at the 
macro level—have been playing out for our nation's individuals and families. One area 
I'd like to focus on in particular is how the income that has been generated by our 
economy over the past three decades or so has been distributed among the various income 
groups, from the top to the bottom. 
  Questions of income inequality, of course, are not part of the Federal Reserve's 
dual mandate from Congress, which is to foster price stability and to promote maximum 
sustainable employment. Nonetheless, this has been an interest of mine for a long time, 
and not only as an academic. In addition to my years as an economics professor at U.C. 
Berkeley, I've also had several stints as a macro policymaker, first on the Federal Reserve 
Board in Washington D.C., then on President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, 
and now at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Much of my interest in macro 
policy has been founded on the belief that it can and should improve the lives of the 
broad range of our nation's people. I think of this as happening through two channels. 
First, policies that reduce the frequency and size of the fluctuations in business cycles can 
spare people the painful disruptions that occur during recessions, or, in the worst cases, 
                                                           
1 These remarks reflect my own views and are not necessarily shared by my colleagues in the Federal 
Reserve System. 
 tragic events like the Great Depression of the 1930s. Second, policies that succeed in 
enhancing the long-run growth of productivity should help lift the average standard of 
living over time. 
By many measures, these two channels have been operating extremely well in our 
economy for some time. In terms of the business cycle, for almost two decades we have 
been enjoying an era that many economists call the "Great Moderation"; in other words, 
recessions have been less frequent, and the swings have been less severe, while, at the 
same time, inflation has come down to quite moderate levels and itself has been less 
volatile. 
Productivity trends also have been very favorable, probably in no small part 
because of the impact of technological advancements. Growth in labor productivity has 
been quite rapid for over ten years now, following more than a quarter century of 
stagnation that began in the early 1970s.  
Given these two developments—more macro stability and more rapid labor 
productivity growth—it is tempting to conclude that most Americans are feeling "better 
off." But a glance at the newspapers suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, 
poll after poll shows that many Americans feel dissatisfied with the long-term direction 
of the economy and are worried about the future. Recent polls by the Pew Charitable 
Trust, the New York Times and CBS News, and various labor organizations indicate that 
growing shares of respondents feel that they and their children will experience a 
diminished quality of life in coming years, and that, even today, working conditions are 
marked by more insecurity and stress than they were a generation ago.
2
                                                           
2 Poll results described in: Leonhardt, David, "Anxiety Rises as Paychecks Trail Inflation," New York 
Times, August 2, 2006; Greenhouse, Steven, "Three Polls Find Workers Sensing Deep Pessimism," New 
 Looking beyond the headline numbers on the macro economy provides some 
clues to the source of this discomfort. In particular, over the past three decades, much of 
the gain from excellent macroeconomic performance has gone to just a small segment of 
the population—those already in the upper part of the distribution. As a result, inequality 
has grown. This inequality, coupled with increased turbulence in family incomes 
associated with job displacement and restructuring, sheds substantial light on the sources 
of the disappointment and concern that show up in the opinion polls. 
  Today I'd like to examine these trends in a bit more detail. I will start with a more 
thorough review of the facts relating to economic inequality and an assessment of some 
of the leading explanations that have been advanced. Then I will broaden my perspective 
to consider other sources of unease, namely, job displacement and income volatility. 
Finally, I will turn to some policy considerations. 
Productivity and real wages  
  A natural place to begin is by looking at average real compensation, that is, 
average wages plus benefits for an hour of work adjusted for inflation. In the U.S., the 
growth in average real compensation has roughly tracked growth in labor productivity, 
which measures the value of output per hour of work adjusted for inflation. When U.S. 
labor productivity growth slowed sharply and unexpectedly in the early 1970s, and then 
stayed sluggish for the next 25 years, growth in average real compensation also was 
sluggish.
3 Then, in the mid-1990s, labor productivity growth surprised us again, only this 
time, thankfully, on the upside: it suddenly took a big jump up—to over 3 percent at an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
York Times, August 31, 2006; Yeager, Holly, "Americans suffer big fall in optimism ratings," Financial 
Times, September 15, 2006. 
 
3 From 1972 to 1997, nonfarm labor productivity rose at only a 1.7 percent rate, while real labor 
compensation rose at an annual rate of 1.3 percent. 
 annual rate—and it has stayed in that vicinity ever since. As I mentioned, this 
development probably stemmed mainly from technological innovations and the huge 
investments businesses made to harness them for production. How has this affected 
average real compensation growth? It has jumped, too, also hitting a 3 percent rate.
4
  From this perspective, then, it would seem that things are looking pretty good. 
However, the public mood does not seem consistent with this view. To see why, we need 
to dig a little deeper. When we look at data on the distribution of real wages, which 
constitute the bulk of compensation, we find striking evidence of increasing inequality. 
For example, economists Robert Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker report that, from 1997 to 
2001, nearly 50 percent of productivity gains went to the top 10 percent of the 
distribution.
5 Importantly, they find roughly the same pattern going back more than thirty 
years. 
Wage inequality  
As Figure 1 shows, from 1973 to 2005, real hourly wages of those in the 90
th 
percentile—where most people have college or advanced degrees—rose by 30 percent or 
more. As I will discuss later, among this top 10 percent, the growth was heavily 
concentrated at the very tip of the top, that is, the top 1 percent.
6 This includes the people 
who earn the very highest salaries in the U.S. economy, like sports and entertainment 
                                                           
4 Despite the widespread view that labor's share of total income has fallen as capital's share has gone up, 
there actually was no net change in these shares over 1997-2005, although there were fluctuations during 
the period. 
 
5 Dew-Becker, Ian, and Robert J. Gordon, "Where Did the Productivity Growth Go? Inflation Dynamics 
and the Distribution of Income," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (2005) pp. 67-127. 
 
6 Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez, "The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International 
Perspective," American Economic Review 96 (2, May 2006), pp. 200-205. 
 
 
 stars, investment bankers and venture capitalists, corporate attorneys, and CEOs. In 
contrast, at the 50
th percentile and below—where many people have at most a high school 
diploma—real wages rose by only 5 to 10 percent.
7  
   What I've described so far is the big picture for wage inequality—the major 
change over three decades. However, an interesting twist on the story has occurred during 
the last decade, when rapid productivity growth raised the real wages of workers 
throughout the distribution for the first time since the 1960s. During this period, as Figure 
1 illustrates, real wages of the lowest earners—the 10
th percentile—actually rose 
somewhat faster than those in the middle of the distribution. The consequence was that 
wage inequality among those in the bottom half of the distribution, which had been 
widening throughout the 1980s, diminished during the 1990s. At the same time, real 
wages at the upper end continued to soar.
8
What explains the rising economic inequality? 
Although there are a variety of ways to explain trends in wage inequality, perhaps 
no cut at the data has been more revealing than the differences in real wages by 
education. As Figure 2 shows, since the early 1980s, the wage gap between college 
graduates and those with a high school education or less has widened dramatically; the 
gap between high school graduates and non-graduates also has widened, but less so. Thus 
it appears that the demand for college educated workers has outstripped the supply.
9 
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8 The basic story about inequality in real wages does not change if one broadens the analysis to include 
benefits or if one examines earnings or family income. 
 
9 The demand for skilled workers was growing during the 1970s as well. But back then, a surge of "baby-
boom" college graduates, together with a rise in labor force participation among educated women, largely 
met that demand and helped to keep their relative wages from rising rapidly. In contrast, during the 1980s, 
 While rising returns to education at the upper end of the distribution led to a pickup in 
college enrollment, the increase in supply has not been sufficient to reduce the wage gap 
between college and high school educated workers.  
It's important to recognize, however, that shifts in the return to education and the 
educational attainment of the workforce cannot fully explain the evolution of inequality 
over the last thirty years because, even within groups with the same level of education, 
the gap between high and low earners has widened too. Indeed, the more advanced the 
degree, the wider the gap becomes. A satisfactory theory must therefore explain not only 
why the demand for college educated workers has risen but also why "residual" 
inequality has increased, that is, the part that is unexplained by education and other 
observable factors.  
Skill-biased technological change 
A primary explanation has focused on the impact of technology. Over the past 
three decades, many sectors of the economy have undergone fundamental change as a 
result of technological advancement, most notably the enormous investments in 
computers and related technologies. These technologies have changed what workers need 
to know to do their work, and, indeed, they have changed the nature of the work itself. As 
a result, there is a greater demand for, and a greater payoff to, workers who have the 
conceptual and organizational skills to use these technologies most effectively. The 
necessary skills are more prevalent among college educated workers, so they are in 
greater demand. However, even among workers with equal educational attainment, skills 
differ.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the "baby bust" slowed the flow of new college graduates onto the market at a time when some believe that 
the demand for skilled labor was actually accelerating. 
 
 For example, consider two college graduates with liberal arts degrees: the one 
who has the skills to use computer power to collect, analyze, and synthesize data may 
have a distinct edge in the labor market over the other who lacks those skills. Similarly, a 
machinist with a high school diploma who can use computers effectively will tend to earn 
more than a coworker who is a technophobe. 
This explanation is summed up in the literature by the term "skill-biased 
technological change." It explains the increased demand for and rising wages of highly 
educated workers and also rising "residual" inequality because skill differences exist not 
only across but also within educational groupings. These skill differences are observed by 
employers and rewarded in the marketplace, but unobservable to researchers.  
Globalization 
A related factor accounting for rising inequality is the increasing globalization of 
labor markets. The most basic way in which globalization might affect inequality is 
through trade, which has raised substantially both imports and exports as a share of GDP. 
Since the U.S. tends to export goods that use skilled labor intensively and to import 
goods that use less-skilled labor intensively, increased trade has, on balance, raised the 
demand for skilled labor and reduced the demand for less-skilled workers in this country. 
In the 1980s, the impact of globalization was especially pronounced for previously well-
paid manufacturing jobs available to U.S. workers possessing a high school degree or 
less. The result has been job losses and excess supply of low-skilled workers, a situation 
that has been intensified by an influx of immigrants with less than a high school 
education. 
 Certainly, globalization has been a factor in the downsizing of several industries 
that employ less-skilled workers—apparel is a good example. And it may account for part 
of the increase in inequality over the last thirty years. But it surely can't be the whole 
story because, for much of the past thirty years, the shift in employment toward an 
increasingly skilled workforce has occurred across a wide range of industries, whether 
they were affected by global trade or not. The logical conclusion is that skill-biased 
technological change has been a dominant force operative across the industrial spectrum.  
In recent years, globalization and skill-biased technological change may have 
been working in combination to particularly depress the wage gains of those in the 
middle of the U.S. wage distribution, accounting for the twist in the trend that I 
mentioned earlier. The explanation goes like this. The surge in the use of new 
technologies that began in the mid-1990s led to major changes in the way business was 
conducted and organized within the U.S. and globally. Technological change and 
globalization, especially outsourcing, complemented the skills of highly able workers 
performing non-routine work requiring problem-solving skills. This explains the 
continued rapid increase in real wages at the top of the distribution. In the middle of the 
distribution, however, technology and globalization had the opposite effect—substituting 
for workers performing routine or repetitive tasks and depressing their wages. At the 
bottom of the distribution, these developments have had little impact during the last 
decade. By that time, many low-wage jobs that could be eliminated by technology had 
already vanished. Most of the remaining low-wage jobs involve manual and service work 
that cannot easily be automated. This may explain why, as I said, wages in the middle not 
 only rose far more slowly than those at the top, they also rose more slowly than those at 
the bottom of the distribution during the 1990s. 
Let me elaborate with an example from the technology side. Take the accounting 
profession. Computers and telecommunications technologies have increased wages for 
accountants, who tend to be at the top end of the distribution. In contrast, in the middle of 
the distribution are workers like bookkeepers, who are being replaced by technology. At 
the lower end, the labor market has already largely adjusted to the impact of skill-biased 
technological change. Therefore, the wages of those workers, who perform manual tasks 
in sectors like business services—janitorial work is an example—are now largely 
untouched by computers.
10  
Globalization in combination with advances in technology, especially 
communications technology, leads to similar patterns. At the upper end, it has boosted 
demand for those who have the skills to manage large, complex, global operations. In 
contrast, an increasing share of domestic jobs in the middle of the wage spectrum has 
experienced lower demand because companies can now look all over the world for 
workers able to perform computer programming tasks, communications tasks, and similar 
jobs—even medical services. At the same time, such outsourcing is far less feasible for 
manual jobs and for service jobs that require face-to-face interactions and lie at the low 
end of the wage distribution. 
                                                           
10Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney, "The Polarization of the U.S. Labor 
Market," American Economic Review 96 (2, May 2006), pp. 189-194. Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and 
Richard J. Murnane, "The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4, 2003), pp. 1279–1333. 
 
  
The top one percent 
These changes in technology and growing globalization go a long way towards 
explaining the inequality trends I have described. And there certainly are other factors 
that have also likely played a role. For example, the fall in the real value of the minimum 
wage appears to have especially depressed the wages of low-skilled women, while 
declines in unionization particularly impacted the wages of less-skilled men. However, 
none of these factors provides a complete and compelling explanation for the rapid 
growth of real wages at the very top of the distribution, the top 1 percent, which, 
according to IRS data, doubled between 1972 and 2001.
11  
The market forces of changing technology and rising globalization, broadly 
understood, may matter to some degree for this group. For example, these forces have 
substantially increased the size of the markets that American companies serve. This has, 
in turn, increased the impact of individuals who are at the very top end of the talent and 
skill distributions—and who tend to be in very short supply. These individuals include 
so-called superstars, such as top entertainers and athletes, highly successful investment 
bankers and venture capitalists, and perhaps CEOs, although the latter point is hotly 
debated. For example, people had a high demand to see Michael Jordan perform—far 
higher than the demand for even a large number of average NBA players—and 
technology enabled his performances to be broadcast to a very large worldwide audience 
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 at relatively low cost. It's not surprising that he, and other superstars, could earn very 
large incomes.
12  
The superstar argument is less clear-cut with CEO salaries, in part because a 
CEO's contribution to the bottom line of a corporation is difficult to measure. Some argue 
that CEO compensation has been driven up by market forces, like the large increase in 
the size of many American companies, which increases the potential benefit of hiring the 
right CEO from the limited pool of candidates.
13
Another possible explanation is the so-called "tournament" model, in which the 
CEO's direct contribution to the bottom line is not so much of an issue. This model 
suggests that large pay differentials for those at the top of an organization function as 
incentives for lower-ranked executives to compete for those positions, in other words, to 
work harder in order to win the top spots themselves one day. The resulting increase in 
effort generates benefits for the company that go well beyond the direct contribution 
made by the CEO.
14
While such competitive factors may matter, I cannot ignore the concerns that have 
been raised of late regarding corporate standards for executive pay-setting. Some 
observers have argued that corporate boards are increasingly beholden to the CEOs 
whose salaries they determine; as a result, CEO salaries may be inadequately monitored 
and sometimes set higher than market conditions or company performance merits. Critics 
of rising executive compensation also have pointed to inappropriate reliance on 
                                                           
12 Rosen, Sherwin, "The Economics of Superstars," American Economic Review 71(5, 1981), pp. 845-858. 
 
13 Gabaix, Xavier, and Augustin Landier, "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?" NBER Working Paper 
12365, July 2006. 
 
14 Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen, "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," 
Journal of Political Economy 89 (5, Oct. 1981), pp. 841-864. 
 
 compensation schemes that hide payments from shareholders and the market—for 
example, the backdating of stock options for top executives, which increases executive 
payouts without properly reflecting the resulting costs in corporate balance sheets. The 
hidden nature of these payouts may reflect an imbalance in the setting of executive pay 
relative to shareholder returns and worker pay more generally. Issues like these quite 
naturally raise concerns for the public and contribute to feelings of dissatisfaction. 
Job displacement and income instability 
Another contributor to feelings of discontent is the perception that job stability 
has declined. Globalization and technology appear to have played roles in these trends as 
well, since they represent changing market conditions that are causing dislocations in 
previous patterns of labor demand.  
It's important to note first that our economy is always subject to large amounts of 
job turnover. Indeed, this is one hallmark of a dynamic, flexible economy, and it is not 
necessarily a bad thing on net. Data on worker flows—movements into and out of jobs—
indicate that about 1 out of 3 job matches are dissolved each year, with a comparable rate 
of worker matching to new jobs.
15 Over half of this job churning is voluntary in nature, 
reflecting worker desires to find a job with higher wages, better working conditions, or a 
different location. Moreover, the degree of job creation and destruction has declined 
somewhat over the past 15 years, creating a picture of a more stable labor market.  
However, involuntary displacement from permanent jobs, due to layoffs or 
downsizing, is important and has been on the rise over the past two decades. In particular, 
rates of worker displacement are up relative to measures of overall labor market 
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New Data Sources and Micro-Macro Links," NBER Working Paper 12167, April 2006.  
  
 conditions, such as the unemployment rate. For example, in the 2001 recession, which 
was relatively short and shallow, there was about as much worker displacement as in the 
early 1980s, when the economy went through the biggest recession in post-war 
history.
16,17
In addition, the distribution of displacement has shifted towards the highly 
educated: workers holding a college degree saw nearly a 50 percent increase in their 
displacement rates between the early 1980s recession and the most recent one in 2001, 
while workers with a high school degree or less actually saw a slight decline in 
displacement rates. So, more educated workers are seeing erosion of their job security 
relative to their less-educated counterparts. Of course, job displacement still remains a 
more significant issue for low-paid workers, but the instability that they have always 
faced has increasingly spread to higher-income groups. 
Involuntary job loss frequently inflicts dire consequences, which have grown 
more severe over time. Involuntary job losers typically are unemployed for at least four 
months, about 70 percent longer than individuals who enter unemployment voluntarily. 
As such, the rising share of permanent job losers among the overall unemployed has 
helped keep the typical length of an unemployment spell stubbornly high over the past 
few decades.
18 The picture looks even gloomier when you recognize that some job losers 
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17 The job displacement figures in this paragraph and wage loss figures in the next paragraph are from 
Henry S. Farber, "What Do We Know about Job Loss in the United States? Evidence from the Displaced 
Workers Survey, 1984-2004," Working Paper #498, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 
January 2005.  
 
18 Valletta, Robert G., "Rising Unemployment Duration in the United States: Causes and Consequences," 
manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, May 2005. 
 
 withdraw from the labor force and are no longer counted as unemployed, so their 
observed unemployment spells understate the severity of the jobless experience. Put these 
factors together and it's clear that periods without earnings can be quite lengthy and 
costly for job losers. Moreover, when displaced workers do find new jobs, they're taking 
a pay cut of about 17 percent on average. The size of this wage loss in the early 2000s 
was the highest in at least 20 years.  
Job displacement also has adverse consequences for health insurance coverage. 
Research shows that job loss substantially reduces access to health insurance over 
extended time periods, and this effect is only partially offset by federal COBRA 
guidelines, which require employers to make continued coverage available—at its full 
cost—to separated employees.
19 The connection between displacement and the loss of 
insurance coverage reinforces a more general trend towards declining coverage through 
employment-based health insurance programs. For example, between 2000 and 2005, 
health coverage through employer-based programs fell about 4 percent nationwide, 
representing a loss of health insurance for several million Americans that was only 
partially offset by increased coverage through government-provided insurance.
20
Given the increase in job displacement and earnings losses that I described above, 
it is not surprising that yearly fluctuations in individual earnings and family incomes have 
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20 Buchmueller, Thomas, and Robert G. Valletta, "Health Insurance Costs and Declining Coverage," 
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 increased sharply since the 1970s.
21 Indeed, between the 1970s and the early 2000s, the 
gaps between the highs and lows in a typical family's yearly income have risen 
substantially. That is, in the 1970s, a typical family might have seen its income vary from 
a high of $60,000 to a low of $30,000 over the decade, while in the more recent decade a 
family seeing that same high would tend to see a low of about $15,000. Among families 
seeing declines in annual income, the size of the typical loss has increased: for example, 
the chances that an American family will see at least a 50 percent drop in its yearly 
income has more than doubled since the early 1970s, rising to about one in six families in 
recent years.  
The increased risk associated with these income fluctuations is likely to reduce 
perceived well-being quite substantially, even if family incomes on average are growing 
over time. As with the risk of job loss, these income risks are most severe for less-
educated Americans. However, during the 1990s, income instability rose relatively more 
for families with high educational achievement, consistent with the spread of involuntary 
job loss to highly educated individuals.  
Policy options 
My focus thus far has been on the problems facing Americans in the labor market 
and not on potential solutions. It is natural to ask, then, whether anything can be done to 
alter these disquieting trends. Since technology and globalization have been identified 
with growing inequality, it might seem natural to look at these areas for possible 
solutions. While I sometimes feel like smashing my own computer, I wouldn't 
recommend this as a national policy! However, it's not uncommon to hear proposals to 
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 put up barriers to trade as a way to mitigate economic disruption and inequality. I don't 
think that is the way to go. By providing for specialization in production across countries, 
trade enhances the size of the economic "pie" here and abroad, and in doing so, enhances 
overall economic welfare. I think we should look to other policy tools to address 
inequality, and I will attempt to provide a useful overview of some key considerations.  
I will begin with education. There can be little doubt that programs that support 
investment in education, broadly conceived, are worthwhile. Increasing skill has been a 
significant source of productivity growth. Moreover, since the gap between the earnings 
of workers with more and less skill in part represents the return to education, a widening 
of that gap clearly signals the need for such investment to increase the supply of higher-
skilled workers.  
  But investment in education takes resources, which complicates the debate: the 
resources are limited and to a large degree should be directed to where they will pay the 
highest return. At the college level, one possibility is just to "let the market work." If 
college pays off, more young people will enroll. Indeed, the rising returns to education at 
the upper end of the earnings distribution did precede an increase in college attendance 
through the mid-1990s, suggesting that market forces may have worked as expected. 
Since then, however, despite further growth in the returns to college and advanced 
degrees, college attendance has flattened out. For example, enrollment rates among recent 
high school graduates hovered around 65 percent between 1996 and 2004, after 
increasing noticeably in the preceding decade.
22
Does this imply that the highest priority for public funding for education should 
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 be the college level? Not necessarily. There certainly is a lot of public discussion by 
educators and politicians about problems with the quality of K-through-12 education in 
the U.S., and international comparisons show that American students rank relatively low 
on standardized tests in science and math, the very kinds of skills that earn higher 
rewards.  
But there is yet another contender for the scarce public funding for education. 
Recently, researchers led by James Heckman from the University of Chicago have argued 
that these funds should be targeted at even younger children.
23 Family background 
factors are critically important in student achievement, and recent evidence suggests that 
the cognitive and social skills associated with college attendance are developed very early 
in life. Moreover, skill acquisition is a cumulative process that works most effectively 
when a solid foundation has been provided in early childhood. As such, programs to 
support early childhood development, such as preschool programs for disadvantaged 
children, not only appear to have substantial payoffs early but also are likely to continue 
paying off throughout the life cycle. 
But what about struggling adults, especially those who find that their skills have 
become outmoded due to technological change or globalization? Should the highest 
priority for public funding of education be the expansion of federally subsidized 
retraining programs, such as those associated with the Job Training Partnership Act, the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, and the Job Corps program for 
disadvantaged youth? Some researchers, such as Alan Krueger of Princeton University, 
view the outcomes of these programs as evidence that training investments often have 
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 high returns, especially for the economically disadvantaged, who cannot finance 
educational and training investments on their own.
24  
Proponents of this view argue that these programs, which have been sharply 
curtailed over the past few decades, should be revived. In contrast, Heckman and others, 
looking at the same evidence, note the high cost of these programs relative to early 
childhood interventions and K-through-12 education, implying that retraining is 
financially unsound on a large scale. At this point, then, the evidence is unclear regarding 
the exact conditions under which adult education and retraining programs are cost-
effective. However, it seems reasonable to consider providing workers buffeted by 
powerful economic forces a fair shot at retooling and finding new careers. 
Beyond education and training, the United States has long deployed an array of 
policy tools to combat inequality and diminish economic insecurity. One example is the 
earned income tax credit, which supplements the earnings of low income workers. 
Unemployment and disability insurance cushion family income in the face of job loss and 
illness, while Social Security shelters many elderly households from poverty. Indeed, 
inequality in consumption among U.S. families is notably lower than inequality in pre-tax 
income due to these programs and others that involve the direct provision of services 
such as healthcare, housing, childcare, and food stamps to families in need. The real 
question is whether government should and can do more. 
To assess the value of and potential need for additional government intervention, 
it is instructive to draw some comparisons between the U.S. and other countries. In 
regard to inequality, over the past few decades it has risen more in the U.S. than in most 
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 other advanced industrial countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, or OECD. Indeed, by most measures, the U.S. ranks near the top (some 
might say the bottom) in terms of household income inequality. The inequality gap in the 
United States is associated with higher levels of overall and child poverty relative to a 
majority of OECD countries.
25
This high and growing level of relative inequality in the U.S. reflects, in part, 
differences in the "social safety net." Among the 30 OECD countries, the U.S. ranks 
above only Mexico, Korea, and Ireland in gross public social expenditures as a share of 
GDP spending, and it does the least to target government taxes and transfers towards 
moving families out of poverty. Not surprisingly, outcomes such as infant mortality and 
life expectancy are worse in the U.S. than in most advanced industrial countries. As for 
workplace protections, unemployment insurance in the United States replaces a smaller 
share of income and offers benefits of shorter duration, while the minimum wage is quite 
low relative to average wages in the U.S. Moreover, U.S. firms face far fewer restrictions 
in their ability to fire or lay off workers than do firms in most other OECD countries.    
Other countries' efforts to mitigate inequality and provide a safety net may come 
at a price, however, since these efforts may hinder job growth and intensify 
unemployment, especially for young and less-skilled workers. Indeed, over the past two 
decades, unemployment rates generally have been higher in other advanced countries 
than in the U.S. Heeding this lesson, some European countries have recently taken steps 
to reduce the distortions associated with generous social insurance programs and 
employment protections. For example, some are following the U.S. lead, placing less 
                                                           
25 The OECD defines poverty as the share of households that receive 50 percent or less of the median 
income in each country and takes account of household size, cash transfers, taxes, and tax credits. 
 emphasis on policies that discourage hiring and more on programs like the earned income 
tax credit. By contrast, the U.S. has done little to move closer to the European model of 
social protections and the reduction of inequality and poverty.  
Conclusion 
 
This comparison of the U.S. and other advanced industrialized countries, though 
just a sketch, is suggestive. The possible responses to rising inequality do not boil down 
to "either/or" kinds of solutions. Rather, these responses range along a fairly wide 
continuum, reflecting the tradeoffs that policymakers face between efficiency and equity. 
Certainly some market-determined income differences are needed to create incentives to 
work, invest, and take risks. However, there are signs that rising inequality is intensifying 
resistance to globalization, impairing social cohesion, and could, ultimately, undermine 
American democracy. Improvements in education are an imperative for reducing 
inequality and an easily justifiable investment, given its high social return. In contrast, 
improvements in the social safety net entail costs, even when policy interventions are 
well-designed from an efficiency standpoint. Even so, in my opinion, they deserve high 
policy priority. Inequality has risen to the point that it seems to me worthwhile for the 
U.S. to seriously consider taking the risk of making our economy more rewarding for 
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Figure 1: Real Hourly Wages for Selected Percentiles
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Figure 2:  Real Hourly Wages by Education
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